Together, we can choose a different path and change our collective fate.
The United States, Russia, and China – including Europe and other regional actors – must increase their efforts to strengthen strategic stability. The short window of opportunity created by the five-year extension of the New START Treaty must be used by political leaders to take tangible steps to enhance strategic stability. Efforts to strengthen strategic stability can play a vital role in stabilizing security relationships and in preventing competition from escalating into open conflict.
The Körber Strategic Stability Initiative developed nineteen principles and policy recommendations that can serve as a starting point to enhance international peace and security.
Joseph R. Biden standing behind a lectern with microphones and holding a speech in the Pentagon.
„We need to take on the dangers and opportunities of emerging technologies, enhance our capabilities in cyberspace, ensure that we are positioned to lead a new era of competition from the deep sea to outer space.“
President Joseph R. Biden
at the Pentagon, Feb-10-2021
„For the first time ever – I want to emphasize this – for the first time in the history of nuclear missile weapons, including the Soviet period and modern times, we are not catching up with anyone, but, on the contrary, other leading states have yet to create the weapons that Russia already possesses […] We must keep moving forward, carefully observing and analyzing the developments in this area across the world, and create next-generation combat systems and complexes.“
President Vladimir V. Putin
at the Federal Assembly, Jan-15-2020
Wladimit Putin standing behind a lectern with microphones and holding a speech.
Jinping surrounded by military personel and standing in an open convertible military jeep that is driving in a parade.
„Major countries around the world [...] are developing new types of combat forces to seize the strategic commanding heights in military competition [...] China’s military security is confronted by risks from technology surprise and growing technological generation gap. Greater efforts have to be invested in military modernization to meet national security demands.“
Chinese White Paper on Defense
"China's National Defense in the New Era", Jul-22-2019

What is Strategic Stability?

Strategic stability describes a state of affairs that aims to minimize all types of risks of deterrence failure.

It can be understood as a state in which the postures, capabilities and doctrines of nuclear-armed states do not incentivize the first-use of nuclear weapons in a crisis (crisis stability); in which those states have an assured retaliatory capability; and in which they do not improve their relative position by increasing strategic arsenals qualitatively or quantitatively (arms race stability). Strategic stability concerns not only the nuclear domain, but also space, cyber and advanced offensive and defensive conventional weapon systems.

Enhancing strategic stability in today’s world will have to take into account diverging views from all relevant actors. What are the greatest threats to strategic stability as seen from the perspectives of the United States, Europe, Russia, and China? And how do their views differ on the preconditions for strategic stability?

Regional Perspectives

Strengthening strategic stability today requires an understanding of the past and the current state of play:

Which key arms control agreements of the Cold War were dismantled?
Which key events have challenged strategic stability in recent years?

Key Events for Strategic Stability

Nuclear weapons stockpiles
Nuclear Weapons Amount of the Superpowers shown in a Line-Graph with Y-axis as Amount and X-axis as Years.

March 5, 1970
Nuclear Weapons & Nuclear Technology
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) consists of three main pillars:

  1. Promoting nuclear technologies for civilian purposes,
  2. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and related technologies, and
  3. Furthering the goal of nuclear disarmament.

Article VI of the NPT commits its 190 state parties – including the five official nuclear-weapons states under the NPT – to:

“pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”

October 3, 1972
Strategic Missile Systems
Interim Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT I)

The Soviet Union and United States negotiated the first agreements to limit nuclear weapons between 1969 and 1972.

The first round of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) produced the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement, the latter capping intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).

A follow-on treaty never entered into force.

October 3, 1972
Missile Defense
Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty)

Anti-ballistic missile systems, or missile defense systems, can erode the other side’s ability to retaliate, thus threatening the principle of Mutually Assured Destruction (and therewith a component of strategic stability).

With the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, Moscow and Washington acknowledged that these systems fuel “the race in strategic offensive arms.” The treaty uniquely barred both parties from deploying nationwide defenses against strategic ballistic missiles, allowing each side to have only two ground-based defense sites with limited numbers of interceptors.

The United States withdrew from the treaty in 2002.

October 3, 1977:
End date of the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT I)
June 1, 1988
Intermediate-Range Missiles
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty)

With the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the Soviet Union and the United States got rid of an entire category of missiles.

Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan sign the INF Treaty, December 8, 1987
Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan sign the INF Treaty, December 8, 1987

The INF Treaty eliminated and prohibited all U.S. and Soviet ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles and their launchers with ranges between 500 and 5,500 km. Both sides destroyed a total 2,692 missiles by the treaty’s implementation deadline in 1991. The treaty also allowed for extensive on-site inspections for verification. In 2014, the United States publicly accused Russia of violating the treaty by developing and testing a new missile in the forbidden ranges of INF.

In 2019, the United States, and in a counter move later Russia, withdrew from the INF Treaty.

December 5, 1994
Warheads & Strategic Delivery Systems
Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I)

The START I Treaty was the first treaty that committed the Soviet Union (and after its breakup the Russian Federation) and the United States to both limits and actual reductions of strategic offensive weapon systems.

The treaty limited the number of nuclear warheads to 6,000 and of strategic delivery systems to 1,600 for both sides. It required the destruction of systems beyond the agreed limits, and included an intrusive verification regime that involved on-site inspections, regular exchange of information, and the use of national technical means such as satellites. All parties met the agreement’s implementation deadline of 2001.

START I initiated a strategic arms reduction process that included the negotiation of two follow-on treaties which never entered into force.

Nuclear Tests
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

After decades of negotiating an agreement prohibiting the testing of nuclear explosives, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty opened for signature to all states in 1996.

It bans nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space, underground or underwater. While China and the United States were among the first states to sign the treaty, their ratification remains pending. The CTBT does not enter into force, however, unless China, the United States and six other countries with specific nuclear technology ratify the treaty.

Russia ratified the treaty in 2000.

June 13, 2002:
End date of Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty)
December 5, 2009:
End date of Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Socialist Republics on Strategic Arms Reductions (START I)
February 5, 2011
Warheads & Strategic Delivery Systems
Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START)

The New START Treaty represents the first verifiable strategic nuclear arms control treaty since START I in 1994.

Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev sign New START Treaty, April 8, 2010
Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev sign New START Treaty, April 8, 2010

It further reduced the number of deployed warheads to a limit of 1,550 as well as of deployed strategic delivery vehicles to 700, and of deployed and non-deployed strategic delivery vehicles to 800. The treaty also expanded the verification regime. Russia and the United States met the treaty’s implementation date of 2018.

Its extension in 2021 until 2026 makes New START the only remaining bilateral nuclear arms control treaty, providing for the continuation of the treaty’s limits and verification measures.

Hypersonic missile tests kick off

The United States tests its first generation of hypersonic missiles as part of the U.S. Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike program. Russia starts to test its own systems in 2012, China in 2014. The arms race of developing (and deploying) hypersonic delivery vehicles begins – and accelerates with advancements of technology.

Expansion of U.S. missile defense systems

After continuous improvements of its missile defense systems since 2002, the United States starts deployments of ground-launched systems in Poland, Romania, and South Korea. In 2017, missile systems able to intercept intercontinental missiles are deployed in Alaska. While the effectiveness of intercepting incoming missiles remains debatable, missile defense systems are seen as a major threat by China and Russia.

Strategic competition and new nuclear arms
The DF-17 missile system, which can carry a hypersonic glide vehicle, at a military parade in Beijing, October 1, 2019.
The DF-17 missile system, which can carry a hypersonic glide vehicle, at a military parade in Beijing, October 1, 2019.

In February 2018, the Trump Administration publishes its Nuclear Posture Review, naming China and Russia as drivers of strategic competition and suggesting the deployment of new low-yield nuclear weapons on U.S. submarines. In March 2018, Vladimir Putin presents Russia’s latest missile systems in response to U.S. weapons developments. Tests and deployments follow shortly thereafter. In October 2019, China parades its newest missile systems on the occasion of its 70th anniversary. Shortly before, it had published a defense white paper that responded directly to being named a strategic competitor by the United States.

August 2, 2019:
End date of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty)
New missiles in a post-INF world
U.S. flight test of a ground-launched cruise missile, August 18, 2019.
U.S. flight test of a ground-launched cruise missile, August 18, 2019.

Shortly after its formal withdrawal from the INF Treaty, the United States starts testing ground-launched missile systems that were prohibited under the treaty. The Pentagon announces development and testing of INF-systems and mentions possible deployment on allied territory in the Pacific. Reports indicate that Russia has started to deploy its 9M729 cruise missile, which NATO allies suspect is in the ranges of the now defunct INF Treaty.

January 22, 2021
Nuclear Weapons
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)

In the context of the nuclear-weapons states’ unfulfilled Art. VI obligations under the NPT, the erosion of the bilateral U.S.-Russian arms control process, and major powers modernizing and upgrading their nuclear arsenals, the vast majority of non-nuclear-weapons states initiated a process that culminated in the multilateral negotiation of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Among other stipulations, the treaty prohibits development, possession, and use of nuclear weapons as well as assistance to do so.

All nine states that possess nuclear weapons as well as their allies remain absent from the treaty, which entered into force after 50 states ratified it in January 2021.

19 Policy Recommendations

For the Future of Strategic Stability

Download all recommendations:Download all recom-mendations:
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The Körber Strategic Stability Initiative

Fundamental challenges to traditional concepts of strategic stability and arms control require new ideas and creative approaches. For this purpose, Körber-Stiftung and the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH) initiated the Körber Strategic Stability Initiative.

Over the course of one year, the project regularly convened a small group of selected think tankers and experts from the United States, Russia, China and Europe (France, the UK and Germany) to develop new ideas and approaches addressing key challenges to stability and security in the 21st century.

The following 19 policy recommendations, completed in April 2021, are the result of this process.

General Principles

In order to avoid the catastrophic consequences of great power conflict in the 21st century, the United States, Russia, and China should manage their competitions by following a number of general rules of the road. They should proceed from a joint understanding that avoiding military conflict will have to involve a basic political willingness to listen and to compromise. They should also refrain from pursuing strategic invulnerability. Moreover, demands for unilateral concessions are not likely to contribute to efforts to manage competition and achieve strategic stability. Finally, arms control is a key policy tool to help bring about strategic stability. For any successful arms control initiative, cooperation and mutual gains will be necessary.
Our current understanding of strategic stability is a product of learning from Cold War crises. In the intensifying great power rivalry between the United States, Russia, and China, many of these lessons seem to be forgotten. Although today’s conditions are different, great powers can benefit from looking back at approaches towards managing competition in the past. The ongoing crisis in arms control and the lack of constructive dialogue create additional pressures to retreat to zero-sum and worst-case thinking – preconditions for arms racing and instability. Reversing that trend will mean (re-)learning the merits of restraint and of arms control. At the same time, a dialogue about the sources of instability is needed and should be possible without necessarily being tied to concrete arms control outcomes.
Enhancing strategic stability between the United States, Russia, and China will be a long, uncertain and iterative process which may have to include a new arms control architecture, as there are more and more novel and evolving strategic strike assets. Parties should exercise due diligence not to overburden any future agenda on strategic stability and instead spend time jointly identifying those areas that lend themselves most to potential cooperative approaches. They should prioritize creativity but refrain from trying to create grand bargains that encompass every challenge. At the same time, efforts to enhance bilateral strategic stability between the United States and Russia should be redoubled.
Strategic stability in the 21st century requires new and innovative concepts that address the asymmetry in capabilities, especially between the United States and Russia on the one hand (both have substantially larger nuclear arsenals than China) and China on the other hand (with a larger arsenal of land-based dual-capable missiles). Parties should be open to address these asymmetries on different levels of engagement – bilaterally, trilaterally or in multi-party talks – depending on the issue and the relationships involved. Concrete security issues should be prioritized over questions of format: the format has to be adapted to the respective issue at hand.
As during the Cold War, strategic stability becomes additionally complex where allies and extended deterrence arrangements come into play. While strategic stability primarily involves Russia, the United States, and China, the concerns of key regional states should be respected and considered. This includes the views of non-nuclear weapon states and other countries’ allies. To strengthen regional stability, great powers should take into account the positions of their allies and the allies of their competitors as their actions can have an important impact on strategic stability through direct and indirect links between regional conflicts, (non-)proliferation and strategic stability. An increase or decrease in strategic stability can contribute to or limit regional interest in proliferation, and vice versa.
Europeans should more actively engage in strategic stability debates by sponsoring both capacity-building initiatives as well as expert-level discussions and act as a trusted convener. They should be more active in encouraging great powers to respect existing norms. Most importantly, Europeans should develop and push their own concrete arms control proposals in order not to remain bystanders in great power competition.

Low Hanging Fruit

Transparency – often considered an early stepping-stone for more ambitious arms control measures – is not always met with enthusiasm by all parties. As an interim measure, the United States and Russia could engage in preparatory steps such as sharing and familiarizing other parties with basic arms control concepts, procedures, practices, and relevant expertise. Such formats could focus on the value and technicalities of verification and should regularly include technical experts, members of the military, and top-level diplomats. This could be a starting point to arrive at a shared view of what arms control can deliver. Bottom-up initiatives in the form of expert exchanges could assist such efforts. This would prevent a decoupling of expert and diplomatic communities in times of great power competition and help establish a level playing field of expertise.
The ongoing P5 process could serve as a framework for discussing strategic risk reduction and confidence-building measures. To improve crisis communication, P5 states could aim to establish “hotlines” amongst all five parties and exchange notifications about planned missile launches. Such procedures would preclude misunderstandings that can lead to escalatory effects and enhance predictability.
In lieu of limitations or reductions, which are more difficult to achieve, joint political declarations could help create a more cooperative environment. An updated declaration of the Reagan-Gorbachev statement that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, together with affirmations not to target each other’s nuclear command, control, and communications for preemption would be important steps.
Any future negotiations will require competent professionals to support the process. With no formal talks over the past decade, Russia and the United States will likely need to recruit and train more diplomats, technical experts, scientists, and lawyers. This is even more critical for actors which have less experience in arms control diplomacy.
COVID-19 demonstrated that external surprise factors, such as a pandemic, can accelerate great power tensions and have a negative effect on the general security environment and on arms control efforts. Certain arms control inspections and observations could not take place or only in a reduced format. Important gatherings such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference and the New START Bilateral Consultative Commission had to be postponed. Parties should identify lessons learned from the COVID-19 pandemic, such as to uphold dialogue, inspections and observations wherever possible and develop secure communication channels.

More Ambitious Goals

When exploring options for an arms control framework between the United States, Russia, and China, a “mix-and-match” approach could be considered. For example, New START provisions could be combined with provisions on INF-range systems, thus setting a common limit for INF-range and strategic systems for all three parties. Besides limiting the numbers, such an approach may also have to address the geographical deployments of INF-range weapons, as an INF-range system next to another country’s borders may be seen as a “strategic” system. This “mix-and-match” approach would help address both the asymmetry in strategic weapons between the United States and Russia vis-à-vis China, as well as China’s large arsenal of INF-range missiles.
Further reading:
Ulrich Kühn (ed.), contributions by Alexey Arbatov, David Santoro, and Tong Zhao,
“Trilateral Arms Control? Perspectives from Washington, Moscow, and Beijing”,
ISFH Research Report #002, March 2020.
U.S. efforts to expand missile defense are often interpreted as deliberate moves away from the principle of strategic stability. All parties should accept that missile defenses should be a legitimate subject of strategic stability talks, despite divergent interests. The United States, Russia, and China should aim at finding mutually acceptable ways to mitigate the negative impacts of missile defenses on strategic stability, acknowledging that missile defenses should not undermine secure second-strike capabilities.
P5 states, as well as the nuclear-weapon states India and Pakistan, should engage in a joint discussion on how to give national leaders as much time as possible in an escalating crisis and against the backdrop of a host of novel political and technological risks. They should pursue a dialogue on maximizing decision-making time and identify which steps could be taken by other parties to contribute to that goal. This could be supported by a joint study on new risks associated with current postures, addressing novel threats by emerging technologies. In parallel, these countries should also accelerate a dialogue on ways to limit and reduce the risks of surprise counterforce strikes originating from nuclear and non-nuclear weapons.
Postures and doctrines can play an important role in minimizing the risk of open conflict. Nuclear-weapon states should adopt policies that clearly reject nuclear compellence. In addition, these states should engage in dialogues explaining how their policies contribute to deterrence and where perceptions might diverge. Such dialogues on nuclear doctrines, postures, messaging, and capabilities could be conducive to limiting the risk of arms racing and prevent potentially destabilizing effects caused by one side believing that the other side has adopted a doctrine that lowers the nuclear threshold.
The increasing entanglement of nuclear and non-nuclear strategic assets creates a risk of inadvertent escalation. Arms control measures between the United States, Russia, China and key regional states should address these risks, for instance by focusing on mutual threat perceptions arising from entanglement and new technologies. The United States, Russia, and China would also benefit from a joint study on escalation implications of entangled weapon systems, and they should take steps towards “disentanglement” where necessary and possible.
Further reading:
James M. Acton,
“Escalation through Entanglement”,
International Security, Vol. 43, No. 1, Summer 2018.
While the technologies of hypersonic weapons are still evolving, it is yet unclear to what extent they will affect strategic stability. On the one hand, they could strengthen a second-strike capability and allow parties to maintain a minimal level of mutual vulnerability without possessing rough numerical parity, thereby enhancing strategic stability. On the other hand, the deployment of hypersonic weapons with strategic missions might lead to various types of ambiguity – from warhead to target ambiguity, due to better manoeuvrability. In addition, they create challenges to warning and decision-making time. To clarify these risks and challenges, states should engage in a dialogue on the impact of hypersonic weapons on strategic stability as a step towards designing applicable arms control mechanisms.
Further reading:
Heather Williams,
“Asymmetric arms control and strategic stability: Scenarios for limiting hypersonic glide vehicles”,
Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 42, August 22nd 2019.
Pressure for developing and employing autonomous technology both in weapon systems and military decision-making will mount as technology and geopolitical competition progress. Specific AI-infused systems could potentially lower the threshold for an attack, and could, in case of technical failures, lead to escalation. States should engage in a dialogue to explain to each other the principles they consider acceptable when including AI in military weapon systems. This could be pursued in parallel bilateral tracks between the United States and Russia and the United States and China, or in a multilteral format.
Cyber threats pose manifold challenges to strategic stability and encompass a range of activities, targets, and actors. Regulation will have to be a patchwork process: long-term, decentralized, parallel, and frequently ad hoc. Priority should be given to mitigating the risks posed by cyber threats in the nuclear domain. As a first step, the P5 should identify a “risk hierarchy” for the nuclear domain where they can agree that cyber competition would be too dangerous and work on establishing norms and rules of the game. An example would be a code of conduct not to conduct cyber attacks against each other’s nuclear early-warning, command, control and communications systems.

During the Cold War, Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev agreed “that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”

Today, this statement is once again relevant. It should serve as a reminder that strategic stability, if implemented correctly, can help stabilize international relations, and thus strengthen peace and security.

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  • Andrey Baklitskiy
    Andrey Baklitskiy is Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Advanced American Studies at the Institute of International Studies of the MGIMO University of the Russian Foreign Ministry and a Consultant at PIR Center. His areas of expertise include nuclear arms control, nuclear non-proliferation, Iranian nuclear program, US-Russian strategic relations.
  • Dr. Corentin Brustlein
    Corentin Brustlein was, until April 2021, the Director of the Security Studies Center at the French Institute of International Relations in Paris. He has been a member of the Advisory Board for Disarmament Matters to the UN Secretary-General since 2018 and holds a PhD in political science from the Jean Moulin University of Lyon. He participated in the KSSI in a strictly personal capacity. 
  • Dr. Samuel Charap
    Dr. Samuel Charap is a Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation, based in RAND’s Washington, DC office. His research interests include the political economy and foreign policies of Russia and the former Soviet states; European and Eurasian regional security; and US-Russia deterrence, strategic stability and arms control.
  • Dr. Liana Fix
    Liana Fix is Programme Director for International Affairs at Körber-Stiftung’s Berlin office. Previously, she was affiliated with the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) and the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP). Her areas of expertise include Russia and Eastern Europe, EU-Russia relations, German Foreign Policy, and European Security.
  • Christoph Heilmeier
    Christoph Heilmeier is a Programme Manager for International Affairs at Körber-Stiftung. His areas of expertise include German foreign policy, U.S. politics and transatlantic relations as well as digitalisation and foreign policy.
  • Prof. Han Hua
    Han Hua is Associate Professor and Director of the Center for Arms Control and Disarmament at the School of International Studies (SIS), Peking University, China. Her research interests cover nuclear-related deterrence and strategic stability both in regional and global perspectives. She has led programs and projects on those areas.
  • Dr. Ulrich Kühn
    Dr. Ulrich Kühn leads the research area “Arms Control and Emerging Technologies” at IFSH and is a Non-Resident Scholar with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His research focuses on arms control and non-proliferation mechanisms, nuclear and conventional deterrence, Euro-Atlantic and European security, and international security institutions.
  • Dr. Dmitry Suslov
    Dmitry V. Suslov is a Deputy Director at the Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies, National Research University – Higher School of Economics, as well as a Deputy Director for Research at the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy. He conducts research and consults the Russian government and business on the US Foreign Policy and US-Russia relations, Russia-EU relations, and Russian Foreign Policy.
  • Dr. Heather Williams
    Dr. Heather Williams is a Lecturer (Associate Professor) at King's College London. She is also an Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and a Senior Associate Fellow with the European Leadership Network. From 2018 to 2019 Dr. Williams served as a Specialist Advisor to the House of Lords International Relations Committee inquiry into the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Disarmament.
  • Tong Zhao, PhD
    Tong Zhao is a senior fellow at the Carnegie–Tsinghua Center for Global Policy in Beijing. His research focuses on strategic security issues, such as nuclear weapons policy, deterrence, arms control, nonproliferation, missile defense, and hypersonic weapons. His current research focuses on possible future arms control options for the major powers.

Further reading

James M. Acton,
“Escalation through Entanglement”,
International Security, Vol. 43, No. 1, Summer 2018.

Andrey A. Baklitskiy,
“High-Precision Long-Range Conventional Systems and their Impact on Strategic Stability”,
PIR Center.

Andrey A. Baklitskiy, Tong Zhao and Alexandra Bell,
“To Reboot Arms Control, Start with Small Steps” - “Архитектура контроля над вооружениями разрушается на наших глазах”,
Kommersant, September 17th 2020.

Corentin Brustlein,
“Strategic Risk Reduction between Nuclear-Weapons Possessors”,
IFRI Proliferation Papers, No. 63, January 2021.

Samuel Charap, Alice Lynch, John J. Drennan, Dara Massicot, and Giacomo Persi Paoli,
“A New Approach to Conventional Arms Control in Europe: Addressing the Security Challenges of the 21st Century”,
RAND Research Report, 2020.

Han Hua,
“China’s proper role in the global nuclear order – A Chinese response”,
Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol. 73, Issue 2, March 4th 2017.

Sergei A. Karaganov, Dmitry V. Suslov,
“The New Understanding and Ways to Strengthen Multilateral Strategic Stability”,
Higher School of Economics National Research University Report, 2019.

Patricia M. Kim (ed.),
“Enhancing US-China Strategic Stability in an Era of Strategic Competition. US and Chinese Perspectives”,
United States Institute of Peace, Report No. 172, April 2021.

Heather Williams,
“Asymmetric arms control and strategic stability: Scenarios for limiting hypersonic glide vehicles”,
Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 42, August 22nd 2019.

Heather Williams,
“Remaining relevant: Why the NPT must address emerging technologies”,
King’s College London Report, August 2020.

Tong Zhao,
“Conventional Long-Range Strike Weapons of U.S. Allies and China’s Concerns of Strategic Instability”,
The Nonproliferation Review, September 14th 2020.


B-52H Stratofortress releasing flares over the Indian Ocean, Feb-19-2020, edited photo on base of license Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-SA 4.0).
Photo: Mizzoujp, Source


Joseph R. Biden, President Joseph R. Biden at the Pentagon, Feb-10-2021.
Photo: DoD / Lisa Ferdinando, Source

Vladimir V. Putin, President Vladimir V.Putin addresses the Federal Assembly, Jan-15-2020.
Photo: kremlin.ru, Source

Xi Jinping, President Xi Jinping reviews troops of the People's Liberation Army, Jun-30-2017.
Photo: Anthony Kwan / Bloomberg via Getty Images, Source


Missile combat crew on alert in underground launch control center, monitoring Minuteman ICBMs, Aug-18-2006.
Photo: United States Air Force, Source

Chinese People's Liberation Army soldiers regarding DF-1 missile at Military Museum in Beijing, Dec-6-2004.
Photo: Frederic J. Brown / AFP via Getty Images, Source

Missile maintenance crewmen perform electrical check on a Minuteman III ICBM, Jan-1-1980.
Photo: DoD / Defense Visual Information Center, Source


1987, Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan sign INF Treaty, Dec-8-1987.
Photo: White House Photographic Office, Source

2011, Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev sign New START Treaty, Apr-8-2010.
Photo: Getty Images, Source

2018/2019, DF-17 missile system, which can carry a hypersonic glide vehicle, at military parade in Beijing, Oct-1-2019.
Photo: Frederic J. Brown / AFP via Getty Images, Source

2019, U.S. flight test of a ground-launched cruise missile, Aug-18-2019.
Photo: Scott Howe, Source

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